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SUMMARY
There is a burgeoning international literature on the rapid spread of new organizational
practices in the dynamic business environment of knowledge-based economies. The
knowledge-based approach to organizations – as opposed to one based on transaction
costs – presumes that the new structures replace the traditional virtues of formalization
and specialization with flexibility and vertical forms, while hierarchical coordination
gives way to trust-based, horizontal network forms. This paper goes against a near
consensus in theoretical literature, arguing that hierarchical coordination persists in
global production networks. It contrasts the experience of peripheral players recently
incorporated into global production networks (GPNs) with the ‘fading-hierarchy’ thesis
of organizational economics. The incorporation has occurred in a vertical manner,
making them subject to hierarchical coordination. This is due to the modernization
patterns found in transforming and some developing countries that are receiving for-
eign direct investment (FDI).
Section 1 describes the modernization patterns, found in newly integrated periph-
eral countries, referred to as modernization through network integration. Network in-
tegration has brought spectacular reorientation of exports. However, there have been
three other changes: (i) a much-increased share of intermediate goods in output and
exports, (ii) a greater concentration of production and export structures, and (iii) a
marked fall in the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the integrated actors. The paper de-
velops the hypothesis that the functional diversity of companies’ activity is strongly re-
lated to intra-organizational embeddedness. Along with other factors, this sets the hier-
archy level of the coordination form to which they are subject. The beneficial macro-
economic and export-composition indicators of countries specialized in ICT hardware
are contrasted with the characteristics of their modernization experiment that display
the properties of industrial capitalism. Though they specialize in ‘new-economy’ indus-
tries, they fail to display knowledge-economy features, which leaves their moderniza-
tion achievements vulnerable.
The persistence of hierarchical coordination in GPNs can be explained. Although
MNC headquarters have to play a new role under intellectual capitalism (integrating
dispersed knowledge into one system), their traditional functions persist (organizing for
and managing efficient resource allocation and output production) and call for tradi-
tional organizational practice. The present functions vary for each stage of the value
chain. The stage that newly integrated peripheral units are concerned with is one that
calls for traditional organizational practice and has retained most from the features of
industrial capitalism. It is subject to diminishing returns in an era of increasing returns.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the new units are subject to hierarchical coordination and
Chandlerian ‘command and control’ mechanisms.
Section 2 investigates whether the integration pattern of peripheral countries can
have a similar developmental impetus, as it could be observed in the high-performing
South-East Asian economies. The paper analyses the differences between the develop-
ment perspectives in the supplier-oriented development strategies of the two groups of
countries and puts forward predictions about future organizational dynamics in GPNs.
5INTRODUCTION*
Much literature on international busi-
ness in the last couple of years has been
devoted to analysing the changes in the
organization of economic activity. Re-
searchers assert that in a knowledge-
based economy, the boundaries of firms
and between firms and markets un-
dergo significant changes (Foss 2002;
Mendelson and Pillai 1999; Grandori
2002; Langlois 2003). The revolution
in information technology has brought
organizational changes that modify
transaction costs, and thereby affect
both the horizontal structure and the
vertical configuration of industries.
The fact that technological
changes call for organizational changes
has long been recognized (Perez 1983;
Henderson and Clark 1990). Three
lines of research can be detected, all
pointing to similar outcomes of organ-
izational change. (i) There is a reduc-
tion in the frequency of hierarchical
coordination. (ii) There is a flattening
of vertically integrated organizations.
(iii) Networks, as a third form of coor-
dination alongside markets and hierar-
chies (Powell 1990), are becoming in-
                                                
* The paper was presented at the BRIE–ETLA
Workshop on the New Economy (Florence, It-
aly, 17–18 October 2003) as part of the re-
search project ‘Tracking the Transformation’,
supported by Fifth Framework Programme of
the EU.
creasingly common in economic activ-
ity.
The point of departure for (i) is
increasing fragmentation of the value
chain (Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001;
Feenstra 1998). This has been driven
by the revolution in information tech-
nology, which cut coordination and
monitoring costs, facilitated codifica-
tion of knowledge, and reduced the
importance of geographical distance, at
least for some activities. In this wise,
the new technology has reduced inter-
nalization-based advantages and re-
versed the process of vertical integra-
tion. Market-based transactions have
squeezed out some of the ones hitherto
coordinated hierarchically. The key
players in an increasing number of in-
dustries have adopted modular organ-
izational structures. Global customers
have started to outsource complex
bundles of value-adding activities re-
lated to a product or subsystem of a
product.1 That means they no longer
seek vertically integrated suppliers with
excellent manufacturing capabilities
and low factor costs, preferring inde-
pendent contract manufacturers capa-
ble of undertaking all the required
functions. Independent units are con-
nected by advanced information and
communication technology (ICT) sys-
                                                
1 Customers require independent process de-
velopment and component design capabilities
of their contractors. They entrust to them the
procurement function, logistics, testing, pack-
aging, and of course financing of the activities.
6tems.2 Hierarchically coordinated, ver-
tically integrated organizations have
thus given way to network organiza-
tions marked by horizontal coopera-
tion, reciprocity and mutual trust, in-
stead of hierarchical supervision of
work processes. Even internal organ-
izational structures and the remits of
subsidiaries have been opened up to
competition. Units now compete for
assignments, and thereby indirectly for
additional resources (Birkinshaw and
Hood 1998), so that ‘market elements’
have been incorporated into the hierar-
chies.
Attention in (ii) is drawn to the
mounting importance of distributed
knowledge (Smith 2000). Ownership
of assets used to be the source of
authority in the traditional organiza-
tions of industrial capitalism. In intel-
lectual capitalism however, a dimin-
ishing proportion of the relevant
knowledge base remains internal in
many industries, and an increasing
part is sourced from outside experts.
Since knowledge accounts for an in-
creasing share of value added and
physical assets for a decreasing share in
intellectual capitalism, ownership and
control is retained over a diminishing
proportion of the production inputs.
The traditional source of authority be-
comes weaker as authority shifts to
those controlling crucial resources of
                                                
2 Hitt 1999 found a marked negative correla-
tion among firms between volume of informa-
tion-technology capital and level of vertical
integration.
information and knowledge. Knowl-
edge sourcing is subject to arm’s length
transactions (Pavitt 2001),3 so that al-
location and exploitation of knowledge
assets cannot be hierarchically coordi-
nated.
The best example of distributed
knowledge is presented by complex,
multi-technology products and sys-
tems, which have become increasingly
prominent in total output and trade
(Prencipe et al. 2002). Multi-
component, IT-intensive products like
aircraft engines, power stations, resi-
dential and office safety systems and so
on incorporate a plurality of technolo-
gies, and firms cannot develop them all
inside. The manufacturers of such
products and systems integrate the
knowledge and coordinate the activity
of various external, specialized suppli-
ers and research institutions. System
integration replaces the authority rela-
tions of ownership-based hierarchies
with the method of coordination ap-
propriate in their case. Increased
knowledge specialization is accompa-
nied by the necessity to coordinate
various actors with different knowl-
edge capabilities.
The point of departure for (iii) is
the new business model that has
emerged in the knowledge-based econ-
omy (Keil et al. 2001; Granstrand
                                                
3 Even with internally held knowledge assets,
the more specialized the knowledge of an actor,
the greater the extent to which hierarchical
coordination loses its hold.
72000). Here sustainable competitive
advantage is determined by factors
other than the traditional determinants
of corporate competitiveness. In the era
being referred to as ‘intellectual capi-
talism’ (Granstrand 2000), companies
have to capitalize on their own as well
as outside knowledge. Simply slicing up
the value chain and the geographically
optimizing factor costs no longer guar-
antees sustainable competitive advan-
tage (Szalavetz 2003). While the latter
calls for hierarchical coordination, the
new core capabilities of combining
new elements of knowledge with tradi-
tional ones and creating new, complex
value, while recognizing, gaining ac-
cess to and exploiting knowledge be-
yond the firms’ boundaries, require
network creation and coordination ca-
pabilities (Ritter and Gemünden 2003).
Nevertheless, the claim that the
relevance of hierarchical coordination
is fading is far from general in organ-
izational economics. Foss 2001 de-
scribes a multitude of cases in which
the presence of authority is still rele-
vant, necessary and so highly probable
even in ‘Hayekian settings’, i. e. the
knowledge economy with a dispersed
knowledge base.
Authority is relevant in cases
where speedy decision-making is
needed, or where economies of scale in
decision-making can be detected. Fur-
thermore, authority may derive from
possessing decisive information. The
setting of business objectives is based
on authority relations, as is the deter-
mination of the incentive structure. An
employee may possess superior knowl-
edge to his/her employer in a specific
context, so that authority-based moni-
toring becomes superfluous, but
monitoring of the achievement of busi-
ness objectives remains the province of
traditional authority relations.
Hodgson 2002 argues that the
idea of ‘internal markets’ or ‘quasi-
markets’ within firms is a myth. In fact,
strategic decision-making is subject to
hierarchical resolutions.
This paper sets out to contribute
to (iii) by contrasting the experience of
peripheral players, recently incorpo-
rated into global production networks
(GPNs), with the ‘fading-hierarchy’
thesis of organizational economics. It is
argued here that hierarchical coordi-
nation persists in GPNs, but not that
nothing has changed or that the sharp
conceptual distinction between firms
and markets has remained the same.
Non-hierarchical forms of coordination
have indeed proliferated as firms con-
centrate their activities within their
core competence, increase their
outsourcing and join GPNs. Within
such networks, it is possible to discern
both pure hierarchical relations and
horizontal forms of co-operation based
on mutual trust and closer to the mar-
ket end of the continuum. The level of
the relations in the hierarchy and
shares of the various forms of coordi-
nation change continually along with
8the competence and position of indi-
vidual network members.
The point is that the incorpora-
tion of the newly integrated peripheral
players into the GPNs has taken place
in a vertical manner, so that they are
subject to hierarchical coordination.
This follows from the modernization
patterns in the transforming and cer-
tain developing countries receiving
FDI.
Section 1 describes the moderni-
zation patterns of the newly integrated
peripheral countries (NIPCs) as mod-
ernization through network integra-
tion. Some arguments are developed for
the hypothesis that the functional di-
versity of the companies’ activity is
strongly related to their intra-
organizational embeddedness and de-
termines, along with other factors, the
level in the hierarchy level of the coor-
dination form to which they are sub-
ject. The beneficial macroeconomic and
export-composition indicators of the
countries that have specialized in ICT
hardware are contrasted with the char-
acteristics of their modernization ex-
periment, which displays the properties
of industrial capitalism. Notwithstand-
ing their specialization in ‘new-
economy’ industries, these economies
do not display features of a knowledge
economy, which leaves their moderni-
zation achievements vulnerable.
Section 2 investigates whether the
integration pattern of peripheral
countries can have a similar develop-
mental impetus as the one observed in
high-performing South-East Asian
economies (HPSEAEs). We analyse the
differences between the development
perspectives of the supplier-oriented
development strategies of the two
groups of countries and develop pre-





The standardization and commodifica-
tion of information technology and the
accumulation of knowledge about it
during the growth phase of its technol-
ogy cycle were marked by a rapid ex-
pansion of output. This luckily coin-
cided with overall opening and liber-
alization of the FDI policies of the
transforming and many developing
countries. In the growth phase of the
technology cycle, when the period of
technological uncertainty is over, tur-
bulent product innovations subside as
industry standards emerge and innova-
tions based on existing technologies
begin. Characteristically, there are pro-
cess and organizational innovations
aimed at cutting costs, fuelled by effi-
ciency-seeking FDI. These intensifying
inward flows have integrated these
countries into the rapidly spreading
9GPNs. Much has been written about the
benefits of FDI to structural moderni-
zation, technological upgrading, cor-
porate competitiveness and macroeco-
nomic performance in recipient coun-
tries.4 This section concerns only the
effects on network integration.
Network integration brought
three types of changes for the recipient
countries, along with a spectacular re-
orientation of exports. (i) They experi-
enced a significant increase in the
share of intermediate goods in their
output and exports. (ii) There was an
increased concentration of their pro-
duction and export structures. Those
specializing in ICT hardware manu-
facturing underwent a spectacular
technological upgrading that led some
analysts to draw exaggerated conclu-
sions based on international compari-
sons of the technology intensity5 or
price/quality position6 of their export
structures. (iii) There was a marked
decrease in the autonomy level of the
actors after their integration.
Growth based on intermediate goods
The rising share of intermediate goods
at the expense of complex, finished
                                                
4 It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a
comprehensive list of general and specific ref-
erences. Here are a few of the papers dealing
with Hungary’s experience with FDI: Csáki
2001; Antalóczy and Sass 2001; Hamar 2001;
Szanyi 2001.
5 Éltető, 2000; Guerrieri 1999; Soós, 2000.
6 Landesmann-Burgstaller 1997; Eichengreen
and Kohl 1998.
products can be attributed to three
factors.
Greenfield investment constituted
the first driving force. Newly estab-
lished production facilities were glob-
ally integrated into the organizations of
their MNC owners. Manufacturing of
certain components was relocated from
other units, so that the output of the
new actors necessarily consisted of in-
termediate goods.
The most spectacular improve-
ment in performance indicators can be
observed in countries whose FDI port-
folios are dominated by resource-
seeking investment.7 These were made
either as greenfield investment or
through privatization. Privatization-
induced restructuring represents the
second driving force behind the in-
crease in the share of intermediate
goods in output and exports. The state-
owned firms privatized used to manu-
facture finished products, but restruc-
turing of their outdated product mix
led them to take a step back along the
value chain. They abandoned their spe-
cialization in complex finished goods,
and soon after privatization, started to
manufacture components and other
intermediate goods instead.
The third impetus came from
changes in investors’ integration pat-
terns. These changes have not been so
                                                
7 The motive behind resource-seeking location
decisions is typically to acquire specific re-
sources such as raw material or labour, at low-
est real cost (Dunning 1993).
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widespread as (i) and (ii). The evidence
is little more than anecdotal in some
sectors of mechanical engineering. Sev-
eral host country-oriented, market-
seeking investments show a change in
the owners’ initial investment motives.
Initially, the product mix at some pri-
vatized companies consisted of com-
plex, multi-technology products and
systems, which were incorporated into
the owners’ global organizations under
a multi-domestic strategy. However,
insufficient domestic demand led own-
ers to abandon their initial, market-
seeking investment motive. Where local
market growth for complex final prod-
ucts failed to meet expectations and
capacity at local subsidiaries was lying
idle, the subsidiaries were entrusted
with component manufacturing for ex-
port. Owners transferred the manufac-
ture of various intermediate products to
them as a lifeline, being forced by poor
market conditions to change strategy
for one that was resource-seeking or
efficiency-seeking, rather than market-
seeking, i.e. a global strategy instead of
a multi-domestic one. This caused such
subsidiaries to move production to an
earlier stage in the value chain.
Concentration of export structure
One conspicuous feature in peripheral
countries that have recently undergone
modernization through network inte-
gration is high concentration of their
production and export structures. A
high share of their output and exports
consists of a restricted number of
products and comes from a small num-
ber of companies.8 This is especially
striking in countries that have special-
ized in specific ICT hardware products
and in other globally concentrated in-
dustries. If global output of a certain
product is concentrated at only a cou-
ple of locations, a single investment
deal can have a huge quantity effect on
a host country’s production and export
structures and on its macroeconomic
indicators. Furthermore, the denomi-
nators of the performance indicators
(GDP, total exports, etc.) were quite
low in the NIPCs, reflecting a low in-
tensity of economic activity, and caus-
ing a variety of statistical distortions in
the first phase of transformation. There
still needs to be caution in drawing
conclusions from the indicators cus-
tomarily analysed, in transforming and
in developing countries (Szalavetz
1998).
Based on the rapid improvement
in the technology intensity of exports
(increased share of high-technology
products in the export structure), ana-
lysts drew premature, exaggerated
conclusions about modernization. In
fact, these countries were still far from
becoming knowledge economies. They
                                                
8 In 2000, the share of the top three foreign-
owned exporters in Hungary’s total exports
was 25.1 per cent. In Costa Rica, also a recently
integrated peripheral country that underwent
spectacular modernization through network
integration and specialization in ICT hardware,
the figure was 29.5 per cent. (Own calcula-
tions based on UNCTAD, World Investment
Report 2002. New York and Geneva: United
Nations.)
11
had merely specialized in the physical
processing of tangible inputs of the
‘new economy’. However, their tech-
nological specialization in itself did not
indicate improved non-price competi-
tiveness or increased innovation poten-
tial. These two vital determinants of
sustainable modernization in the age of
intellectual capitalism are still lacking.
Reduced autonomy
In the early years after network inte-
gration, the incorporation of the new
actors in the global structure of manu-
facturing was marked by geographical
separation of production-related serv-
ice activities from production (physical
processing activities). Some of the
physical processing tasks have been
assigned to newly acquired and mod-
ernized companies. On the other hand,
marketing and sales departments, de-
sign laboratories and research and de-
velopment facilities were closed down
as unnecessary under conditions of ex-
clusive intra-firm supplies and manu-
facturing according to the technologi-
cal specifications of the owner. In most
cases, even the procurement function
became superfluous, as the owner-
customer organized just-in-time deliv-
ery of raw materials and components to
the subsidiary. Traditional suppliers
were not considered reliable enough, so
that the owners preferred to do busi-
ness with their own longstanding part-
ners to supply their newly acquired
subsidiaries. Thus local companies that
used to perform all corporate functions
have become single-function produc-
tion facilities within a wider organiza-
tion.
This reduction in autonomy can
be associated first with the step back
along the value chain, mentioned ear-
lier. Manufacturing intermediate prod-
ucts according to the technological
specifications of a customer-owner re-
quires fewer autonomous decisions
than manufacturing complex finished
products. Secondly, pre-production
and post-production activities will have
been transferred to other members of
the network. Activities lost are ones
whose contribution to value creation
has ever increasing importance and
higher than average knowledge-
intensity, such as R and D, design, pro-
cess development, marketing, sales,
pre-sales and after-sales service.
Functional diversity means a di-
versity of intra-organizational and
network connections. The number of a
network member’s connections with
other units in the network correlates
strongly with its level of autonomy.
Mono-functional processing en-
tities are linked only to intra-firm cus-
tomers and – passively – to suppliers.
They are in a position of strict subordi-
nation to head office. If they organize
procurement independently, on the
other hand, their links with their sup-
pliers become active and their auton-
omy level increases, as they select and
monitor suppliers, provide them nec-
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essary technological specifications and
so on. If subsidiaries are entrusted also
with prototyping and process develop-
ment, they develop intra-organizat-
ional links with other units’ technicians
and engineers responsible for process
development. The coordination of
technical and technological issues takes
place on a cooperative basis of equal
parties sharing knowledge, not on hi-
erarchical terms. If local subcontract-
ing subsidiaries design the component
they manufacture, the number of their
links with other network members in-
creases, since they have to cooperate
with designers of other modules of the
product. They will be able to influence
the architectural design of the subsys-
tem into which their component is in-
corporated. Their links multiply again
and their subordination decreases even
more if they also take on product cus-
tomization.
To sum up, diversity of corporate
functions in a subsidiary brings deeper
organizational embeddedness, which
reduces the degree of subordination.
Newly integrated companies had their
corporate functions severely restricted
and their organizational embeddedness
was minimal, which affected both their
autonomy level and the coordination
pattern of their activities.
There is little need to explain that
the hierarchy level of the intra-
organizational and intra-network rela-
tions of new network members is not
determined by spatial features. It can-
not be claimed that peripheral players
as such are subject to vertical integra-
tion and hierarchical coordination. The
hierarchy level of a specific coordina-
tion mechanism depends on the variety
and system embeddedness of its cor-
porate functions and not on the actor’s
geographical location. The hierarchy
level of production facilities located at
the centre of the world economy is
similar to that of production facilities
in peripheral countries. On the other
hand, R and D units or marketing and
sales units in peripheral countries are
normally granted similar autonomy as
to similar centrally-located units. The
only difference between central and
peripheral single-functional produc-
tion units is that the former find it eas-
ier to improve their organizational po-
sition, gain access to additional re-
sources, and entrusted with additional
and more knowledge-intensive assign-
ments and functions by lobbying head
office (Birkinshaw 2000; Birkinshaw
and Hood 1998). Head-office assign-
ments develop more rapidly and the
subsidiary’s initiatives meet less resis-
tance.
Value chain stage and hierarchy level
The incorporation of new peripheral
members in GPNs has moderated the
overall tendency towards hierarchy re-
duction within them. The persisting
heterogeneity of coordination forms
can be explained by the emergence of
new roles that MNC headquarters have
to perform in intellectual capitalism,
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while still carrying out their traditional
functions of strategy formulation and
provision of strategic and organiza-
tional leadership. The new role
prompted by the emergence of intel-
lectual capitalism is to integrate dis-
persed knowledge into one system. The
core functions of MNCs include recog-
nizing and assimilating external
knowledge elements, coordinating
agents that possess them, and ensuring
they are applied optimally and effec-
tively. This function requires a coordi-
nation mechanism different from hier-
archical, command-and-control,
authority-based relations
However, the traditional func-
tions of MNC headquarters typical of
the era of industrial capitalism have
remained vital in certain contexts. This
traditional function of organizing for
and managing efficient resource allo-
cation and output production calls for
the traditional formal procedures, cen-
tral decision-making and hierarchical
coordination. Headquarter functions
vary at each stage of the value chain.
The stage of concern to newly inte-
grated peripheral units is one that ne-
cessitates traditional organizational
practices and preserves the greatest
share of the characteristics of industrial
capitalism: it is one subject to dimin-
ishing returns in an era of increasing
returns. At this stage, MNC headquar-
ters behave as cost-minimizing units,
i.e. the transaction cost-based approach
to organization applies (Williamson
1975 and 1985), as opposed to the
knowledge-based approach. The activ-
ity of new members is therefore
marked, unsurprisingly, by rigid task
definitions and high reliance on formal
rules and procedures They are subject




DYNAMICS – PROSPECTS FOR
PERIPHERAL ACTORS
The patterns of network integration
just described suggest that the resulting
modernization is vulnerable. FDI in-
flows in ICT manufacturing have not
led to the emergence of a new type of
capitalism, in which new organiza-
tional practices are necessary. Network
integration has been driven mainly by
factor-cost differences. This is a typical
determinant of local competitiveness in
the era of industrial capitalism, but not
in the new business model of intellec-
tual capitalism. The integrators were
not setting out to exploit some distinc-
tive local knowledge or capabilities.9
The main draw was cheap and reliable
labour.
                                                
9 There are attractive exceptions – cases of
home-base augmenting and technology-
seeking flagship investments (see the categories
of Kuemmerle 1999), creating local R and D
units. But they remain individual instances too
small in number to support any general con-
clusions.
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At first sight the initial ‘victory’ in
global locating competition suggests a
sustainable development path for the
newly integrated countries receiving
FDI. Such modernization is sustainable
according to optimists who refer to
‘transfer-driven modernization’. Fur-
ther development will be driven by
rapid capacity expansion and – from a
quality point of view – by the ability of
local subsidiaries to accumulate tech-
nology.
In fact, superficial network inte-
gration with a minimal number of sys-
tem interactions leaves it easy for the
subsidiaries’ business to be transferred.
Furthermore, if organizational em-
beddedness, i.e. deep and extensive re-
lationships with other corporate units,
exerts a positive influence on subsidi-
aries absorptive capabilities (Anderson
et al. 2001), lack of it effectively hin-
ders the accumulation of local compe-
tence.
In principle, there are two ways
for ICT-driven, modernization-
inducing network integration to occur:
(i) inclusion of many local, independ-
ent SMEs in global networks through
information technology, and (ii) geo-
graphical dispersion of FDI to new pe-
ripheral locations. International busi-
ness literature abounds in success sto-
ries about service SMEs in peripheral
countries having adopted e-business
strategies, provided application services
via the Internet, and thereby helped to
improve the economic performance of
their countries. (Coviello and McAuley
1999; Teubal and Avnimelech 2001)
ICT enhances the internationali-
zation and network integration possi-
bilities of SME, even in manufacturing.
According to HPSEAE success stories
(Bell and Pavitt 1992; Hobday 1994;
Kim and Nelson 2000), local compa-
nies follow a trajectory of technological
learning and capability accumulation.
At the end of a multi-stage process,10
the competitive advantage of local ac-
tors grows to such an extent that they
become capable of competing head on
with established producers of certain
products or, at least of becoming hori-
zontally integrated specialized suppli-
ers within GPNs.
This type of subcontracting-
oriented development and dynamic
learning has brought network-position
improvement up to a point, but be-
coming horizontally integrated inde-
pendent contract manufacturers is not
feasible for two reasons. First, network-
position improvement for independent
production units is much more de-
manding nowadays, in an era of global
suppliers, than it was a decade or two
ago. Gradually acquiring a nodal posi-
                                                
10 The rungs of the ladder can be well desig-
nated by OEM (original equipment manufac-
turing), ODM (own design and manufactur-
ing) and finally OBM (own brand manufac-
turing). Approaching the issue from the angle
of innovation activities, the stages can be de-
scribed as imitation, process innovation, in-
cremental product innovation and radical in-
novation. Several other approaches are found
in the literature on the various taxonomies of
the technological capabilities of firms. (For a
summary, see Radosevic 1999.)
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tion in the network, improving one’s
status from a supplier-subcontractor to
a network member that organizes re-
gional procurement and sales, up to the
status of a contract manufacturing-
services provider operating on a global
scale requires more than manufactur-
ing excellence. Nor is it sufficient to
master knowledge-intensive, intangible
value-adding activities related to pro-
duction. Such capabilities have to be
combined with an ability to finance ca-
pacity build-up and procurement, es-
tablish advanced IT systems, and do all
the other capital-intensive corporate
functions required to assume the com-
plex bundle of value-adding activities.
Irrespective of their capabilities,
local companies that face financial
constraints and are unable to concen-
trate huge resources and finance in-
vestment will never attain the high de-
gree of autonomy granted to contract
manufacturers. Rapid technological
learning will not improve the financial
position of peripheral operating units.
Although moving up the ladder of
technological learning brings some
capital accumulation, even in an opti-
mal case, the financial strength of local
companies remains far below the level
required to become a nodal member of
the network.
The other side of the coin is un-
derdevelopment of local financial mar-
kets, which leads to the second ex-
planatory factor of the differences be-
tween the development perspectives of
NIPCs and HPSEAEs. The latter (espe-
cially Korea and Taiwan) have a vastly
greater volume of state resources avail-
able and the willingness and capacity
to mobilize them and engage in devel-
opmental intervention.11
The obstacles to an HPSEAE type
of modernization are not confined to
institutional inefficacy or want of re-
sources, although these two are formi-
dable barriers. Exacerbating the prob-
lem in the transforming economies is
lack of will to intervene. After decades
of a command economy with distorted
prices and state ownership, large sub-
sidies have become discredited. It has
become unimaginable to apply the kind
of instruments and methods used in
HPSEAEs or give large amounts of sub-
sidy for investment and exports. The
role that publicly owned enterprises
played in technical and industrial de-
velopment in the HPSEAEs, through
subsidized technology licensing and the
purchase of foreign capital goods is in-
conceivable.
Actors in peripheral economies
have hardly any alternatives other than
vertical integration into GPNs, which
furthermore offers several advantages
for new network members possessing
weak national production and innova-
tion systems. They benefit from trans-
fers of technology and know-how.
With privatized facilities, vertical inte-
                                                
11 For the role of the developmental state in the
HPSEAEs, see Wade 1990.
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gration enables comprehensive re-
structuring of local facilities. This com-
plex range of transfers proves vital to
successful integration of peripheral
network members.
As for future organizational dy-
namics, the main issue is whether such
peripheral countries can embark on a
sustainable path of modernization, de-
spite the changes in the institutional
and business environment already dis-
cussed. Does their specialization in ICT
hardware manufacturing induce grad-
ual development, manifested in im-
proved positions for local actors in
GPNs? What are the preconditions for
such development?
Before addressing these questions,
let us consider an issue relevant in the
shorter run: the possibility of creating
local networks. How can local subsidi-
aries get beyond their present ‘satellite’
position within networks? An impor-
tant structural weakness in peripheral
countries that have undergone mod-
ernization through network integration
is that MNCs often fail to create for-
ward and backward linkages with do-
mestic firms. The embeddedness of lo-
cal MNC activity in the host economy is
minimal, at national and regional level.
This also reduces technology and pro-
ductivity spillovers, indirect employ-
ment generation, etc.
The low intensity of inter-firm
cooperation can be explained partly by
the specific features of certain indus-
tries. It has been persuasively demon-
strated that industry characteristics
have a marked effect on the extent of
local vertical linkages of country-
specific, parent firm-specific, and sec-
tor-specific determinants of local con-
tent ratios in the production of 272
Japanese companies in 24 countries
(Belderbos et al. 2001). Such linkages
are less frequent in high-technology
sectors than in mature ones. Since
component production in most high-
technology industries is extremely con-
centrated globally, it is subject to global
sourcing and most unlikely to lead to
the creation of a network of local sup-
pliers and local sourcing of tangible
inputs. Strategies aimed at developing
complementary domestic linkages and
thereby accelerating technology diffu-
sion and growth will show poor effi-
ciency in countries specialized in high-
technology industries like electronics
and/or ICT hardware. In these indus-
tries, the emergence of a local network
that incorporates local suppliers does
not depend exclusively on endogenous
factors, i.e. on local companies’ suc-
cessful movement along the industrial
learning curve. The factors are exoge-
nous factor, to do with global suppliers’
locating decisions. If several MNCs be-
longing to the same value chain decide
to locate their activities in the same ag-
glomeration, a network of local suppli-
ers will emerge.
Although these findings are sup-
ported by the experience of NIPCs,
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there are cases belying the argument
that industry specifics represent a clear
determinant of the propensity to en-
gage into local supplier-network crea-
tion. For several HPSEAEs, notably Ko-
rea (Ernst 2002) and Singapore
(McKendrick et al. 2000),12 a strong,
dynamic and flexible local supplier
base represents an important determi-
nant of sustained modernization in the
electronics and ICT industries. The ex-
istence of a local supply base even in
globally concentrated industries rep-
resents another significant difference of
industrial upgrading experience and
development prospects between
HPSEAEs and NIPCs.
In fact, it was not the creation of
local networks but their incorporation
into global networks that was the main
force behind the modernization and
catching-up of peripheral countries.
However, local operational units have
to become increasingly embedded in
the host location to produce a further
improvement in performance. Eco-
nomic policy needs to promote this ob-
jective, not necessarily by striving to
‘create’ local tangible input suppliers,
but rather by making local actors ca-
pable of offering strategic business
services, such as software development,
testing, logistics etc. Industries marked
by a globally concentrated supply chain
and a low propensity to establish local
                                                
12 In Singapore the „local’ supplier-base of the
hard disk drive industry is in fact regional:
networks span Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia,
China and the Philippines.
networks of tangible input suppliers
may still have a demand for local in-
tangible input supplies. This seems
worth pursuing, as intangibles account
for a rising share of total inputs.
Promoting existing manufactur-
ing firms’ diversification into knowl-
edge-intensive production-related sup-
port services, i.e. developing increas-
ingly complex and specialized supply
chain capabilities, is a good method of
improving their position within the
network and increasing their internal
network embeddedness.
Despite the changes in the insti-
tutional and business environments
discussed here, network participation
offers plenty of development opportu-
nities for local subcontractor-
subsidiaries if they can undergo a
conscientious programme of functional
upgrading. The realistic prospect for
their development is not to improve
their position within the network up to
a point of becoming independent, hori-
zontally integrated contract manufac-
turers, but rather to improve it within
the organization. Having moved along
the traditional industrial learning curve
and accumulated technological and
functional capabilities, local subsidiar-
ies may become regional competence
centres within their MNC organization,
and some may even acquire world
product mandates (Birkinshaw 1996).
However, in an era of contestable
intra-firm positions, the state needs to
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take a more active, ‘developmental’ ap-
proach. It may not be enough just to
follow a passive policy that allows local
actors at the micro level and the host
economy at macro level to be driven
ahead by modernization-inducing FDI.
Retaining existing investors, attracting
new ones and promoting functional
upgrading of local subsidiaries is the
best channel to increasing local value
added. It is also essential because if
countries specialized in ICT hardware
face a massive divestment move by
their existing investors, they can hardly
step upwards or specialize in even
more technology-intensive, higher-
technology industries. The gradual in-
dustry-upgrading experience of the
HPSEAEs, involving a move from low-
technology industries to high-
technology ones that sustained the
modernization process, would not be
feasible for NIPC that were already spe-
cialized in high-technology industries
at the beginning of their modernization
process.
* * * * *
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